Introduction
Digitalization has dramatically lowered the costs of storing and processing large stocks of consumer information, enabling new forms of advertisement targeting, personalization tools, and price discrimination schemes. Personal consumer information has therefore become a valuable asset in the marketplace and an important element of rm strategy. Nowhere is this trend more visible than in online services, where rms are aggressively capturing large stocks of consumer information. Usage of these information-intensive services by consumers implies provision of personal information, and rms exploit such information to generate new sources of revenue. These tradeos are dening business models and the role of privacy in online marketplaces.
Prominent examples of these trends can be identied among major Internet players. Google provides consumers with services to search the web, manage their email correspondence (gMail), contacts (Google+), calendar events (Google Calendar), and documents (Google Docs). Consumers provide personal information to use these services, informing Google about their location, interests, and social connections when performing searches, communicating with others, and managing their documents, and derive a direct benet from the services in doing so. Google in turn derives revenues from disclosing this information by proling consumers and charging advertisers to target them. A larger stock of consumer information increases the eectiveness of the targeting and allows Google to derive higher disclosure revenues, although advertising reduces the benets consumers derive from the services. Google's business model is readily understood by consumers: free services in exchange for ads.
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Other major Internet players such as Microsoft and Amazon compete with dierent approaches.
Microsoft has recently introduced Oce 365, an online service which competes with Google's by allowing consumers to edit documents, manage email, contacts, and calendar events. In contrast with Google, however, Microsoft charges consumers for the service and does not disclose their information for advertising purposes. Microsoft's recent Scroogled! campaign emphasized the dierence in the following terms: Google goes through every gMail that's sent or received, looking for keywords so they can target gMail users with paid ads. And there's no way to opt out of this invasion of your privacy. Outlook.com is dierent we don't go through your email to sell ads.
Amazon plays an important role in online search by indexing a large number of products and allowing third-party sellers to supply them through its websites, competing with Google as a search gateway in the retail arena. Amazon also exploits consumer information to prole users based on their search interests and past purchases, and derives revenues by disclosing this information to sellers. Furthermore, through its Special Oers program, Amazon has started to subsidize 1 We use the term disclosure to refer to the exploitation of consumer information for revenue-generating purposes, even though some forms of exploitation may not imply information sharing with third-parties. For example, spot markets for online advertising may not allow advertisers to observe the identity of target consumers. Nonetheless, we expect the outcome to approximate that of information sharing because the rm exploiting the information will account for the objective function of advertisers in order to maximize revenues. consumers willing to accept advertising on their mobile devices. Consumers currently benet from $15 and $20 discounts when purchasing Kindle tablets and e-readers, respectively, if willing to accept targeted advertisements from Amazon and third-party sellers displayed on the device. This subsidy renders the basic Kindle e-reader one of the cheapest devices of its kind.
These examples illustrate the choices consumers face when providing their personal information to online services and the revenue streams rms can tap into by disclosing it. The question is now, how does this aect competition? Should rms exploit all available revenue sources, prices and disclosure, or focus on one? If so, which is more protable and what does it depend on? In this paper we present a model to analyze the strategic interactions generated by consumer information provision and rm disclosure and how they aect competition in the marketplace. To the best of our knowledge, we contribute the rst analysis that explains how the provision and disclosure of consumer information shapes the competitive interaction of rms.
We build on a standard vertical dierentiation framework to capture the informational dimension of the problem, and do so by adopting a reduced-form specication for service quality which captures the tradeos outlined above. Firms provide a homogeneous service to consumers and compete on prices and information disclosure. On the demand side, consumers are the gatekeepers of their personal information, and they observe the level of disclosure rms engage in as well as their price before deciding which service to patronize (if any) and how much personal information to provide it with. The perceived quality of the rm's service for each consumer increases with information provision and decreases with the rm's level of disclosure. On the supply side, there are two revenue sources available to rms: sales revenues originating from the prices charged to consumers, and disclosure revenues which depend on their level of disclosure and stock of consumer information. Firms may choose to exploit both, to forego sales revenues by subsidizing consumers, or to forego disclosure revenues by not engaging in disclosure.
Our analysis provides insight on how rms compete for consumer information. We show that rms can exploit consumer heterogeneity by dierentiating in their levels of information disclosure, and can prot from doing so even though this sacrices disclosure revenues. Dierentiation is reected on both the level of disclosure rms engage in as well as on the revenue source they choose to exploit. A rm engaging in a high level of disclosure (low-quality service) chooses to subsidize consumers, and a rm engaging in a low level of disclosure (high-quality service) charges positive prices. Such an outcome is a direct consequence of competition, as we show that a monopolist never chooses to subsidize consumers. Moreover, the presence of disclosure revenues can drive the high-disclosure (low-quality) rm to derive higher prots in the marketplace, contrary to what would be predicted by a standard vertical dierentiation framework.
Our analysis also provides insight on the eect of competition on consumer privacy by explaining the aggregate stock of consumer information disclosed by rms. We nd that the stock of consumer information disclosed in the marketplace is generally lower under competition than under monopoly. Thus consumers derive higher surplus and benet from competition, as should be expected. But perhaps counterintuitively, higher intensity of competition between rms (which can be captured in our analysis by the heterogeneity of the consumer population) can result in an increase the stock of information disclosed, reducing consumer privacy. Consumers still benet from competition, but do so through prices (or subsidies) rather than through reductions in the disclosure of their information. Moreover, we also nd that the high-disclosure rm can contribute the most to consumer surplus. From a policy perspective, this implies that high levels of disclosure can be expected in a competitive marketplace and need not reduce consumer welfare when compensated by subsidization.
The model we use to derive our results is internally complex but tractable, and provides for clean qualitative predictions in equilibrium. We fully endogenize all the information decisions of market participants, and the only exogenous parameters in our analysis are those that dene the distribution of consumer valuations for the service. To obtain the results, several simplications are needed. We do not model the interactions arising in the secondary market for consumer information disclosure. Instead, we assume rms operate as price-takers, for example by participating in a competitive advertising market. We restrict our analysis to covered market equilibria where all consumers choose to sign up for one of the services, and consider only the case where consumer valuations are uniformly distributed and marginal costs are zero. Our analysis is best suited to online services operating with large user bases and negligible marginal costs.
Our model provides a benchmark for consumer privacy in the context of informed and rational consumers. We assume consumers are aware of the disclosure practices of rms and internalize their impact in their decisions and usage of services. Consumers have access to a growing set of resources to learn about these practices, and privacy regulations increasingly require rms to inform prospective customers about their disclosure activities.
2 Although we recognize that factors such as bounded rationality or cognitive biases can distort consumer decisions regarding the provision of their personal information, we expect consumers to become increasingly familiar with privacy tradeos in the marketplace. Such consumers can be interpreted as privacy pragmatists according to survey classications of privacy attitudes: they are concerned about privacy but are willing to trade it o if an evaluation of the benets and risks pays o. A growing majority of US consumers have been reported to pertain to this category.
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In the next section, we position our paper in the context of the recent managerial and economics literature relating to online privacy. Section 2 introduces the building blocks of our model and 2 News outlets, consumer advocacy groups, and industry initiatives provide consumers with avenues to learn about the privacy practices of online services. For example, The Wall Street Journal has recently published indepth reports about online privacy explaining common disclosure schemes, the Electronic Frontier Foundation tracks and reports industry developments and best-practices, and Privacy Score provides consumers with updated scoreboards for popular online services. Privacy regulations are also playing a role in fostering consumer awareness. For instance, EU Directive 2009/136/EC requires websites that employ activity tracking tools such as cookies to explicitly disclose their existence to consumers in a comprehensive and user-friendly manner. 3 See Alan Westin's report`How online users feel about behavioral marketing and how adoption of privacy and security policies could aect their feelings,' Privacy Consulting Group, March 2008. the timing of the game. We characterize the monopoly solution in Section 3. This serves as a benchmark to evaluate the implications of competition. We proceed to solve the case of duopoly in Section 4, explain the drivers of dierentiation and provide a qualitative comparison of the duopoly and monopoly outcomes. In Section 5 we discuss the managerial and policy implications of our results by examining rm performance and consumer privacy in equilibrium, and also review the main empirical implications of our model. Section 6 concludes.
Literature
Privacy is a multidisciplinary concept which has been studied across several elds including economics, law, sociology, and political science. Our work relates to the economic dimension of privacy, understood as the control over access to information by economic agents and its associated tradeos. Posner (1981) and Stigler (1980) famously argued that privacy can lead to allocation ineciencies, and is therefore undesirable in the absence of externalities or explicit preferences for privacy. This view has been challenged more recently. Hermalin and Katz (2006) analyze the implications of dierent privacy regimes and their impact on allocative eciency in the absence of such externalities and preferences, and nd that privacy can be socially desirable in some cases.
Calzolari and Pavan (2006) evaluate information disclosure between two principals sequentially contracting with a common agent who strategically decides whether to report her true type, and
show that the eect of privacy on welfare is ambiguous. Hui and Png (2006) provide a survey on the economics of privacy and argue that externalities generally play an important role in the collection and exploitation of consumer information.
Our approach is motivated by the most prevalent forms of exploitation of consumer information in online services, such as advertising. These forms of exploitation have a negative impact on consumers in the form of attention costs or search bias (or do so beyond some overload threshold).
In addition, consumers generally exhibit an explicit preference for privacy over their communication channels. Noam (1995a Noam ( , 1995b ) provides a prescient account of the privacy implications of advances in electronic telecommunications, and argues that a competitive marketplace can contribute solutions to consumer demands for privacy. Spulber (2009) reviews the evolving market structure of online search and advertising services, and argues that competition in this market can discipline the disclosure policies of search rms and increase the share of the surplus appropriated by consumers. Our work formalizes these arguments and explains the precise impact of competition in this market. We show that gains in consumer surplus associated with higher intensity of competition need not result in privacy improvements when information disclosure is protable for rms.
Our model relates to the growing literature on two-sided markets pioneered by Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Caillaud and Jullien (2003) , as well as later contributions such as Armstrong (2006) . Firms in our model can be interpreted to intermediate a two-sided market where con-sumers provide personal information on one side and advertisers purchase the information which is disclosed on the other side. Most applications in the literature consider settings where each side of the market benets from participation on the other side, implying that positive externalities are present between both sides. In our setting, similarly to Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2010), consumers benet from the services provided by the intermediary rms but derive disutility from disclosure, implying that the disclosure side generates negative externalities on the consumer side.
Thus our model also addresses the question of when it is optimal for rms to adopt a one-sided business model and exclude the side that generates negative externalities.
Our model does not explicitly address the rationale for intermediation in the marketplace, though we note that such intermediation is consistent with the presence of negative externalities. Our focus diers from the above contributions in that we consider the eect of consumer 4 The price commanded by the personal information of consumers will also depend on its broader availability. Note that consumers single-home in our model, so rms become gatekeepers of the information they accumulate through their services. Reports from the data brokerage industry suggest that consumer information in abundant supply such as names, addresses, and emails, as well as demographics including age, race, and occupation, command a low price in the marketplace. Information on sensitive topics such as health related interests and gambling propensity, or time-sensitive events such as marriage, pregnancy, or divorce, are in limited supply and command higher prices. See for instance`Everything we know about what data brokers know about you', ProPublica, March 7 2013. information provision on the quality of services rather than on prices. Our approach relates to that of Akçura and Srinivasan (2005) , who rst examined the tradeo faced by the monopolist deriving both sales revenues and disclosure revenues. They analyze the case where the monopolist decides the supply of information required of consumers in order for them to participate in the service. Our approach diers in that we examine the case where consumers unilaterally decide how much information to provide and we also analyze competition. Because consumers derive positive utility from information provision in our model, our approach is better suited to applications where consumers directly benet from providing information (e.g., search engines, cloud storage) and Akçura and Srinivasan's model is better suited to applications where consumer information mainly benets the rm (e.g., airline bookings, retail banking). We further relate our ndings to those of Akçura and Srinivasan in our monopoly analysis in Section 3.
In recent years, several papers have examined consumer attitudes toward online privacy. Chellappa and Sin (2005) present a survey to evaluate the tradeo consumers face when providing personal information to online services. They measure consumer valuations for the personalization benets as well as consumer concerns regarding alternative uses of their information by the rm.
They nd that consumers' positive valuation for personalization exceeds their negative concern for privacy. Tsai et al. (2011) report an online shopping experiment based on a search engine where results are annotated with privacy ratings based on sellers' privacy policies. They nd that subjects are willing to pay a premium for privacy when such information is salient. Tucker (2011) analyzes the eectiveness of a personalized advertising campaign in a social network, and nds that it is positively aected by consumers' perceived control over the use of their personal information.
The ndings reported in these papers suggest that consumers account for privacy considerations when deciding which rms to patronize and how much personal information to provide.
Other empirical contributions have considered the supply side of the market. Preibusch and Bonneau (2013) analyze the degree of dierentiation in the data collection policies of major Internet sites according to trac rank in several service categories. They nd a signicant degree of dierentiation in search engines and social networking, categories that meet the characteristics of those considered here. They also nd that services operating under less competition tend to request consumers to supply more personal information. Goldfarb and Tucker (2010) evaluate the impact of privacy regulations in Europe on the eectiveness of online advertising. These regulations restrict the information that can be collected and processed from consumers for the purpose of targeted advertising, in eect restricting information disclosure by rms. They nd that such restrictions signicantly reduce advertising eectiveness, and should therefore be expected to reduce the disclosure revenues of rms.
The model
Consider a market with two rms and a unit mass of consumers. Firms supply a homogeneous service and compete on two separate dimensions: price and privacy. Each rm sets a price p j and a level of consumer information disclosure d j for its service. Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of the service, which is uniformly distributed across the consumer population. The valuation of consumer i is given by
For tractability, we restrict our analysis to equilibria where the market is covered. A necessary condition that guarantees full market coverage
Consumers participating in the market and signing up to the service of one of the rms decide how much personal information to provide, and we denote the information provision of consumer i to rm j by y i,j . 5 The utility derived by consumer i from rm j, given price p j and disclosure level d j , is given by
where the expression y i,j (1 − y i,j − d j ) captures the informational quality of rm j's service for consumer i. The specication implies that informational quality is concave in y i,j and decreasing in d j , so consumers stand to benet from providing information y i,j to the rm but incur disutility from rm disclosure d j . 6 The marginal benet of information provision is decreasing: the information provided by each consumer is decreasing in its relevance to the service. Both y i,j and d j are endogenous and will be jointly determined in equilibrium. Consumers need to provide some information to derive positive utility from the service and rms may choose to engage or not in disclosure, y i,j ≥ 0 and d j ≥ 0. Also note that the rst term on the right-hand side of (1) identies the consumer's willingness to pay for the service. Consumers may sign up for the service of one of the rms or remain out of the market, and so we normalize the outside utility of consumers to zero.
Firm prots originate from two revenue sources, the prices directly charged to consumers and disclosure revenues originating from the exploitation of consumer information. We simplify the latter by adopting a reduced form for disclosure revenues. The prots of rm j when serving
Our specication implies that disclosure prices are exogenous and are normalized to 1. Note 5 When usage of the service implies information provision, y i,j can also be interpreted as usage intensity. 6 We assume for simplicity that consumers always derive disutility from disclosure. If consumers exhibit an acceptance threshold for disclosure, for example if a certain degree of advertising is acceptable, then disclosure in our model can be interpreted as the level of excess advertising that rms engage in. however that the relative weight of disclosure revenues with respect to the price revenues charged to consumers will depend on consumers' willingness to pay, which in turn depends on the rm's level of disclosure and consumer valuations for the service. The boundaries on V − and V + ensure that the analysis encompasses cases where feasible disclosure revenues are higher than price revenues and cases where they are lower. We also let rms set negative prices if they choose to subsidize consumers. We assume that rms face zero marginal costs to simplify the analysis, and without loss of generality, assume xed costs are zero.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the rst stage, rms simultaneously set their disclosure level d j . In the second stage, rms simultaneously set prices p j . In the third stage, having observed disclosures and prices, consumers choose to sign up for the service oered by one of the rms or to stay out of the market. In the fourth stage, consumers patronizing a rm decide how much information y i,j to provide it with.
Firms are committed to the level of disclosure they announce in the rst stage and cannot increase it after obtaining consumers' personal information. This modeling assumption reects the fact that reputational concerns and privacy regulations make it costly for rms to backtrack on their disclosure commitments or to deceive consumers. For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires US nancial institutions to provide consumers with a notice and opt-out opportunity before they disclose their information to unaliated third-parties, making it costly for rms to increase information disclosure ex-post. Another example is that of US retailer Toysmart.com, which after ling for bankruptcy was blocked by the FTC from selling customer information. The sale was considered deceitful to consumers because the company's privacy policy stated that when you register with Toysmart.com, you can rest assured that your information will never be shared with a third-party. 7 3 Monopoly benchmark We start our analysis by considering the monopoly case, which serves as a benchmark to evaluate the impact of competition in the next section. We proceed to solve the monopolist's optimization program by backwards induction.
Information provision. Consider the problem of consumer i in the fourth stage when deciding how much information to provide rm j with when using its service. The consumer maximizes u i,j in (1) by choosing y i,j given the rm's disclosure level d j and price p j , which implies
Optimal information provision is homogeneous across consumers, y i,j = y i ,j for all i and i , so that 7 See`FTC Sues Failed Website, Toysmart.com, for Deceptively Oering for Sale Personal Information of Website Visitors,' FTC press release, July 2000. the rm obtains the same amount of information from each of its users.
Purchasing decisions. We next consider the problem of consumer i in the third stage when deciding to sign up for rm j's service or stay out of the market. The consumer evaluates the utility derived from the service given by u i,j in (1), anticipating optimal information provision given by (2) , and signs up only if u i,j ≥ 0. We proceed by identifying the valuation of the indierent consumer v f who is strictly indierent between signing up or not. Solving for u f,
Note that ∂u i,j /∂v i > 0 given optimal information provision in (2), so consumers with a higher valuation than the indierent consumer v i > v f will prefer to sign up and those with lower valuation v i < v f will prefer to stay out. Therefore, when v f > V − , some consumers do not sign up and the market is uncovered, and when v f ≤ V − , all consumers sign up and the market is covered. Because the monopolist's demand diers in the covered and uncovered market congurations, both cases need to be considered separately in what follows.
Monopoly pricing. We next analyze the pricing problem of the monopolist in the second stage given disclosure level d m . Consider rst the case of an uncovered market. Given that consumer information provision in (2) is homogeneous across all consumers signing up for the service, we can write the monopolist's prots as
and solving for the optimal price in an uncovered market, denoted by p u m , obtains
Consider next the case of a covered market. Monopoly prots are then given by
and the monopolist's optimal price in a covered market, denoted by p c m , is given by the highest price that ensures all consumers sign up. In this case, the indierent consumer v f must coincide with the consumer with the lowest valuation in the population.
Monopoly disclosure. Consider the rst stage when the monopolist sets disclosure level d m . Inspection of y j in (2) reveals that the valid disclosure range of the rm is given by d j ∈ [0, 1], given that negative disclosure or negative information provision are both unfeasible. In an uncovered market conguration, plugging optimal price p u m in (5) into prots π u m in (4) obtains monopoly prots as a function of disclosure π u m (d m ). Maximizing π u m (d m ) with respect to d m subject to the constraint d m ≥ 0 (feasible disclosure range) and v f (p u m , d m ) > V − (uncovered market) obtains optimal disclosure in an uncovered market
No uncovered market solution exists outside this parameter range. Therefore, a necessary condition for the monopolist to choose not to cover the market is V + ≥ 2, which we have ruled out (see Section 2) .
Consider next the case of a covered market. Plugging p c m in (7) into π c m in (6) obtains prots as a function of disclosure π c m (d m ). Recall that optimal price p c m ensures that the market is eectively covered. Maximizing π c m (d m ) with respect to d m subject to the constraint d m ≥ 0 (feasible disclosure range) obtains optimal disclosure in a covered market
The following proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 1. The monopolist chooses to cover the market in equilibrium and customers provide information
The monopolist faces an important tradeo in determining the price and the level of information disclosure oered to consumers. On the one hand, an increase in price reduces demand for the service, which reduces the user base and the information stock over which the rm can extract disclosure revenues. On the other hand, an increase in the level of disclosure decreases consumers' willingness to pay for the service, thus reducing price revenues. In addition, the monopolist faces an information provision tradeo when setting the level of disclosure. The provision of information by consumers signing up for service is decreasing in the level of disclosure, and consumers prefer not to provide information to the rm when it engages in maximum disclosure. As a consequence, the monopolist considers only intermediate levels of disclosure, striking a balance between the information stock obtained from consumers and the revenues from disclosing it.
The monopolist always covers the market in equilibrium. If there are consumers with low valuations for the service (V − < 1), it chooses to engage in information disclosure (d m > 0). 8 Note that π u m (d m ) does not depend on d m when V + = 2. In this particular case, the monopolist is indierent when choosing disclosure level d m , so we proceed by assuming that the monopolist chooses d m = 0 under indierence. Moreover, because ∂d m /∂V − ≤ 0, the larger the mass of consumers with low valuations, the higher the level of disclosure. Intuitively, when average willingness to pay for the service is low, the monopolist cannot extract much consumer surplus through price revenues. Thus, revenues from information disclosure are comparatively higher and d m > 0. When willingness to pay for the service is high, however, price revenues become comparatively more attractive and the monopolist prefers that monetization mode. In fact, when V − ≥ 1, the monopolist chooses not to disclose information d m = 0 so that it can charge the largest possible price for the service. Figure 1 illustrates the impact of changes in the mean and in the spread of the consumer population's distribution of valuations. For the reasons just discussed, an increase in the mean valuation that preserves the spread drives the monopolist to increase price and to reduce disclosure.
An increase in the spread that preserves the mean of the distribution implies that consumers become more heterogeneous in their valuations, and this reduces the price revenue that the rm can extract. This drives the monopolist to lower the price in order to ensure that all consumers participate and to increase the level of information disclosure.
Our monopoly analysis is closely related to that of Akçura and Srinivasan (2005) , who rst analyzed the problem of the monopolist facing a tradeo between sales revenues and disclosure revenues. In both cases, higher levels of information disclosure in equilibrium command lower prices for consumers. An important dierence, however, is that the monopolist may subsidize some consumers in their model. This outcome arises in Akçura and Srinivasan's analysis because they consider the case where the monopolist can decide the information provision required of each consumer. In our model, consumers decide unilaterally how much information to provide. In this context the monopolist never chooses to subsidize consumers, and we show in the next section that subsidization will only arise under competition. 9 4 Competing with privacy
We next evaluate the case of duopoly. A straightforward implication of our model is that rms supplying homogeneous services will benet from dierentiated disclosure levels. Inspection of u i,j in (1) reveals that if two rms set the same disclosure level, they become perfect substitutes for consumers, so price competition then drives their prots down to zero. Thus, we let j ∈ {l, h} and assume without loss of generality that d l ≤ d h . Firm l discloses less consumer information than rm h (when the inequality is strict so that rms are dierentiated), and as a consequence its product is perceived as being of higher quality than that of rm h.
Information provision. To solve for the equilibrium, note that consumer information provision in the fourth stage as characterized in (2) carries over to the case of duopoly for each rm.
Purchasing decisions.
We examine the problem of consumer i in the third stage when deciding whether to sign up with rm l or with rm h. 10 Consider rst the case where the highdisclosure rm prices above the low-disclosure rm, p h > p l . In this case, all consumers derive higher utility from rm l, so rm h obtains zero demand and prots. Below, we show that rm h can obtain positive prots by undercutting the price of rm l. Therefore, p h > p l will never arise in equilibrium.
Consider next the case where the high-disclosure rm sets a price lower than that of the lowdisclosure rm, p h ≤ p l . When rms are dierentiated, note that ∂u i,l /∂v i > ∂u i,h /∂v i > 0 given equilibrium information provision y j in (2), so that high-valuation consumers will sign up with rm l and low-valuation consumers will sign up with rm h. We can identify the valuation of the pivot consumer v p who is strictly indierent between signing up with rm l and rm h by equating
9 It can be shown that subsidization also arises in our specication if information provision y m is chosen by the monopolist or assumed to be exogenous. Thus the absence of subsidization under monopoly is explained by the fact that consumers unilaterally decide their information provision. It is also worth noting that Akçura and Srinivasan (2005) consider a specication where disclosure revenues depend on consumer valuations. In our model, consumer valuations for the service and disclosure revenues are independent; higher consumer valuations do not translate into higher disclosure revenues. However, in some cases, both may be correlated. Wealthier consumers with a higher willingness to pay are also more valuable targets for advertisers. We note that if consumer valuations were positively correlated with disclosure revenues in our model, this would reduce the monopolist's incentives to cover the market, given that serving low valuation consumers becomes comparatively less protable. 10 As noted in Section 2 and proved below, our assumptions on the distribution of consumer valuations imply that the market is fully covered in equilibrium. We have also analyzed uncovered market congurations under duopoly, but unfortunately found them to be intractable. Nonetheless, we believe that the covered market conguration is empirically relevant given the high market penetration enjoyed by free or subsidized online services.
When the market is covered, consumers with v i ∈ [V − , v p ) sign up with rm h and consumers v i ∈ [v p , V + ] sign up with rm l.
Duopoly pricing. Consider the pricing problem of both rms in the second stage. Prots in a covered market conguration given disclosure levels d l < d h and prices p h < p l are
Solving the corresponding system of price best-response functions we obtain a unique pair of equilibrium prices, p l (d l , d h ) and p h (d l , d h ).
Duopoly disclosures. Plugging equilibrium prices p l (d l , d h ) and p h (d l , d h ) from the previous step into rm prots π l and π h in (9) we obtain prots as a function of disclosure levels, π l (d l , d h ) and π h (d l , d h ). Solving the system of disclosure best-response functions we obtain the equilibrium disclosure levels, d l and d h .
The following proposition presents the equilibrium. Proposition 2. In the duopoly equilibrium, the market is covered and customers patronizing rm j ∈ {l, h} provide information
Firms quote prices
Consider the three parameter regions shown in Figure 2 below. In Region A, the equilibrium disclosures of both rms are in the interior:
In Region B, rm l is at the corner where it chooses not to disclose consumer information: Finally, in Region C both rms are at the corner:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Firms competing with privacy benet from dierentiating in their levels of disclosure in order to cater to distinct consumer segments. The left panel in Figure 2 depicts three regions over the parameter space (V − , V + ) which are denoted by A, B, and C. The equilibrium expressions for d l and d h dier across the three regions. Region A contains interior equilibria where both rms engage in disclosure (0 < d l < d h ), Region B contains corner equilibria where only one of the rms engages in disclosure (d l = 0 < d h ), and Region C contains corner equilibria where neither rm engages in disclosure (d l = d h = 0). Region B is further subdivided into two subregions B1 and B2 where the prot ranking of both duopolists diers. Note that dierentiation breaks down in Region C because engaging in disclosure is not protable for rms when consumer valuations are high and mostly homogenous. This follows from the fact that rms engaging in disclosure need to subsidize consumers, but disclosure revenues are xed and independent of consumer valuations.
We further discuss this result and the prot ranking of rms in Section 5.1. In order to understand the shape of the three regions depicted in Figure 2 , recall that we do not consider points above the 45 o line because V − < V + . Also, as we show in Appendix A, there are no equilibria with full market coverage when parameters V − and V + are to the right of the line with slope 2 that begins at V + = 1. The interior boundaries V * and V * * that separate the three regions originate from the disclosure best-responses of both rms.
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An important property of the duopoly solution is that rms (mostly) focus on a single revenue source. Firms choosing to engage in disclosure exploit disclosure revenues, and rms choosing not to engage in disclosure (or performing a low level of disclosure) exploit price revenues instead.
Across most equilibria, rms engaging in disclosure subsidize consumers by quoting negative prices, and only rms that do not engage in disclosure quote positive prices. Dierentiation, therefore, is reected on both the level of disclosure rms engage in and also (as a consequence) on the revenue source they exploit. Moreover, disclosure levels are mutually reinforcing because they exhibit strategic complementarity; if one rm increases its level of disclosure the best-response of the other rm is to also increase its own level of disclosure (given that equilibrium best-responses satisfy ∂d b l /∂d h > 0 and ∂d c h /∂d l > 0). In the remaining of this section we review the properties of duopoly disclosure levels and prices and compare them with those of monopoly. We relegate our analysis of rm prots and information stocks to Section 5, where we also discuss the empirical implications of our results.
In order to review the properties of the duopoly solution, we proceed by separately reviewing the impact of changes in the spread and the mean of consumers' distribution of valuations. Consider the right panel in Figure 2 . but where σ v increases (as V + grows). We use these two parameter trajectories to generate the remaining gures of the paper.
The spread of the distribution of consumer valuations σ v determines the scope for dierentiation in the marketplace. This in turn determines the intensity of competition, because it aects the ability of rms to compete when setting dierent levels of disclosure.
12 Figure 3 depicts the impact of variations in the spread. When the spread is small, so that consumer valuations are almost homogeneous, both rms engage in a similar level of disclosure. This results in intense price competition and low prots, driving both rms to heavily subsidize consumers by quoting 11 For completeness, we have also evaluated unilateral rm deviations to uncovered market congurations. The shaded region in the right panel in Figure 2 identies parameter values where the solution derived in Proposition 2 does not constitute an equilibrium of the game in which rms may choose not to cover the market. The analysis of uncovered market deviations is included in Appendix B. 12 Although our analysis is restricted to the case of duopoly, we expect the implications of consumer heterogeneity to apply more generally. Note that a lower valuation spread reduces the valuation dierential between the consumers served by each rm. This drives rms to reduce their eective dierentiation, or the dierence in their levels of disclosure, in order to attract consumers. The same mechanism would be present with the entry of additional rms in the market. negative prices. As the valuation spread converges to zero, V + − V − → 0, the disclosure of both rms converges to the monopoly solution and rm prots converge to zero. When the spread increases so that consumers become more heterogeneous in their valuations, one rm chooses to increase its disclosure above that of the monopoly solution and the other rm reduces its disclosure below it, so that the eective dierentiation of both rms increases. This softens price competition and allows rms to increase prices, thus increasing prots.
The impact of an increase in the valuation mean E v is depicted in Figure 4 . This increases the average willingness to pay of consumers and therefore increases potential price revenues for rms, which reduces the comparative attractiveness of disclosure revenues and drives them to reduce disclosure levels. When both rms are actively engaged in disclosure (Region A) they can do so increasing their dierentiation, which allows them to increase their price and their prots.
When consumer valuations are suciently high (Region B), the low-disclosure rm chooses not to engage in disclosure and focuses exclusively on price revenues. This is the only instance of positive prices that arises in equilibrium (with the exception of a small neighboring range of the parameter space). Eective dierentiation is reduced as the high-disclosure rm further reduces its level of disclosure. When consumer valuations increase further (Region C), neither rm engages in disclosure and competitive pressure drives prices and prots down to zero. We further discuss this outcome where dierentiation breaks down in Section 5.1.
Having characterized the duopoly solution, our next proposition establishes the qualitative impact of competition in the marketplace.
Proposition 3. Comparison of the duopoly and monopoly solutions reveals that competition has two main eects on the marketplace: the introduction of a low-disclosure (high-quality) service when consumers exhibit low valuations V − < 1, given by d l < d h ≈ d m , and subsidization of the high-disclosure (low-quality) service, p h ≤ 0 < p m .
Duopoly prices Σ v 1 14 Regarding the second part of the proposition, note that the monopolist quotes a positive price but the duopolist supplying the high-disclosure service quotes a negative price to subsidize consumers (Regions A and B) or zero price when not engaging in disclosure (Region C). Clearly, the dierence in pricing is due to the competitive pressure faced by the duopolist, as in both cases consumers exhibit positive willingness to pay for the service. It can be shown that the price dierential under both regimes, p m − p h , decreases with the valuation spread σ v which determines the intensity of competition. Thus our model predicts that consumer subsidization in the presence of disclosure revenues is a direct consequence of competition.
It should be clear that both of the above eects of competition benet consumers, allowing them to select into lower disclosure alternatives and subsidizing them under higher levels of disclosure.
The rst eect benets high-valuation consumers the most, and the second eect benets mainly low-valuation consumers. Both eects also contribute to explain the relative protability obtained by each duopolist. In the next section we disentangle in more detail the impact of competition on rm prots and consumer surplus.
Discussion
In this section we examine the managerial, policy, and empirical implications of our results. In order to proceed it is useful to formalize additional notation rst. We will denote the market share of rm j by s j . The market share of rm j when serving
market can be written as
We dene the information stock of rm j, denoted by Y j , as the total stock of consumer information accumulated by the rm in the marketplace. Given that the market is covered in equilibrium and information provision is homogenous across consumers signing up for each service, the information stock derived by rm j is given by
The information disclosed by rm j, denoted by Y d j , is then given by Y d j = d j Y j . We can write the surplus enjoyed in equilibrium by consumers signed up with rm j as
We start by reviewing the managerial implications of our results.
Managerial implications
The prots of rms competing with privacy are asymmetric in our model. Prots vary with the valuations of the consumer population, and neither duopolist consistently outperforms the other one. Inspection of the duopoly solution yields the following result.
Proposition 4. Duopoly prots are increasing in the consumer valuation spread (decreasing in the intensity of competition) and non-monotonic with respect to the consumer valuation mean (willingness to pay). The high-disclosure rm derives higher prots and market share when the valuation mean is low (π l < π h and s l < s h in Regions A and B1), the low-disclosure rm derives higher prots and market share when the valuation mean is high (π l > π h and s l > s h in Region B2), and both rms are engaged in Bertrand competition and derive zero prots when the valuation mean is very high (π l = π h = 0 in Region C).
The prots of both duopolists increase with the consumer valuation spread, given that a higher spread increases the scope for dierentiation (see our discussion above in Section 4 as well as Figure 3 ). The mean valuation of the consumer population, which captures the willingness to pay, exhibits a more complex impact on prots and determines the prot ranking of both rms. When the mean valuation is low (Regions A and B1 in Figure 2 ), the high-disclosure rm derives higher prots in the marketplace. It achieves this by engaging in a high level of disclosure and heavily subsidizing consumers. Conversely, when the mean is high (Region B2), the low-disclosure rm outperforms the high-disclosure rm by quoting positive prices and not engaging in disclosure.
When mean valuation is very high (Region C), neither rm engages in disclosure and both derive zero prots. Figure 5 plots the prots and market shares of both rms to illustrate the argument.
The result is driven by the fact that disclosure prices are xed (and exogenous) in our model, so the relative protability of disclosure for rms depends on consumer valuations. When consumers exhibit low willingness to pay for the service, disclosure revenues are comparatively high, so the high-disclosure rm can oer subsidies to attract low-valuation consumers away from the competitor while remaining protable. When consumers' willingness to pay for the service is high, however, disclosure revenues are low in comparison and attracting consumers to the highdisclosure service is less protable. The low-disclosure rm becomes comparatively more attractive for consumers and can sustain positive prices. When the willingness to pay is very high, such that consumer valuations are high and mostly homogenous, disclosure revenues are insucient for the high-disclosure rm to protably attract consumers given that the subsidies required to do so would result in negative prots. Dierentiation therefore cannot pay o, and both rms wind up supplying zero-disclosure services and face intense price competition. The result shows that an increase in consumers' willingness to pay, which would always benet a monopolist, can render rms worse o under competition.
Another property of our model is that the prot ranking of rms corresponds with their market share ranking. As shown in Figure 5 , the most protable rm also commands a larger market share in the duopoly equilibrium. This implies that rms maximize prots at the extensive rather than the intensive margin, outperforming competitors by attracting a larger customer base rather than by extracting higher revenues from a smaller base. This holds for the rm exploiting disclosure revenues when consumer willingness to pay is low as well as for the rm exploiting price revenues when it is high. Although the result hinges on our assumption that consumer valuations are uniformly distributed, it suggests that market shares can be a good predictor of protability even when rms exploit disclosure revenues (i.e., rms do not sacrice prots for market share)
An immediate takeaway of our analysis is that lower disclosure (higher quality) does not imply higher prots in the marketplace. In fact, when the willingness to pay of the consumer population is low, the contrary is true. This outcome diers from that of a standard vertical dierentiation model, where the highest quality rm is always the most protable (and which corresponds to the low-disclosure rm in our model, which has the highest informational quality for consumers).
Another point of divergence is that dierentiation can break down in our model, with rms engaging in Bertrand competition when consumer valuations are very high. Both divergences are due to the presence of an additional revenue stream which is inversely related to quality, and which intensies competition in our model by enabling rms to subsidize consumers. 13 
Policy implications
We next examine in more detail the implications of competition on the information stocks accumulated and disclosed by rms. This provides a useful metric of consumer privacy in the marketplace and determines (together with prices) the surplus derived by consumers. Inspection of Y j , Y d j and CS j provides the following result.
Proposition 5. Under duopoly, the stock of consumer information obtained by each rm is equivalent when they both engage in disclosure, and the low-disclosure rm's stock is larger when it chooses not to engage in disclosure (Y h ≤ Y l with strict inequality if d l = 0). Total consumer information disclosed is decreasing in consumer valuation mean (willingness to pay) and non-monotonic with respect to consumer valuation spread (intensity of competition). Comparison of the duopoly and monopoly solutions reveals that competition generally lowers information disclosed and increases consumer surplus
m except for a subset of Region B2, and CS h + CS l > CS m ).
To understand the result, consider rst the determinants of the information stock accumulated by rms in the marketplace. The information stock obtained by each rm is a function of both 13 See Wauthy (1996) for a detailed characterization of equilibrium market congurations and prots in the standard vertical dierentiation model. We note that the Bertrand outcome in our model is similar to the preempted market conguration identied by Wauthy where the high-quality rm prices the low-quality rm out of the market. In our model, the high-quality rm cannot preempt the market by quoting a positive price because the low-quality rm can sustain negative prices with disclosure revenues. Competition is therefore more intense and the preempted market conguration arises only (under consumer indierence between both rms) when the high-quality rm lowers its price down to zero, eectively driving both rms to Bertrand competition. Also note that the market is never preempted by the low-quality rm in Wauthy's analysis nor in our model, despite the presence of disclosure revenues. its user base and its level of disclosure on how many consumers provide it with information and how much information each consumer provides. Under duopoly, when both rms engage in disclosure, they obtain the same information stock in equilibrium because asymmetries in their user bases and disclosure levels even out (Region A). When the low-disclosure rm does not engage in disclosure, it obtains a larger information stock than the competitor (Regions B and C, under consumer indierence in the latter).
The total information stock obtained by rms is generally larger under duopoly than under monopoly. When consumers with low valuations are present (V − < 1) so that disclosure-intensive services are supplied under both market congurations, duopolists generally obtain a higher information stock. This follows from the fact that their average disclosure level is lower than that of the monopolist and consumer information provision is linear in disclosure. When no consumers with low valuations are present (V − > 1) so that zero-disclosure services are supplied, the information stock accumulated by duopolists coincides with that of the monopolist. The exception to the above is the region neighboring V − = 1 where duopoly disclosures are marginally higher than that of the monopolist (the subset of Region B2 where V − > 1, given that d m = 0 < d h ). Therefore, if the policy maker's goal were to maximize the information stock accumulated by rms in the marketplace, our model suggests that eective competition is the best way to achieve it.
Consider next the eective stock of information disclosed by rms, as depicted in Figure 6 .
The total stock of information disclosed in the marketplace is generally lower under duopoly than under monopoly (with the exception of the subset of Region B2 noted above). Competition drives rms to accumulate a larger information stock and disclose a smaller part of it. Moreover, a high level of disclosure under competition need not result in a high volume of information disclosed, because consumers account for it when selecting which service to patronize. It can be shown that the eective stock of information disclosed by the high-disclosure rm in equilibrium Y d h varies only marginally with its disclosure level d h .
An important result of our model is that higher competition intensity need not improve consumer privacy in the marketplace. Or more precisely, a reduction in the spread of consumers' valuation distribution, which intensies competition, can increase information disclosed Y d h + Y d l rather than decrease it. The intuition for this result lies in the fact that rms can translate competitive pressure both to prices and to disclosure levels, so competition can discipline the former rather than the latter. Consider the impact of a reduction in the valuation spread that intensi- Intuitively, rms prefer to sacrice the revenue source that is less protable and can do so by compensating consumers through the other source (through lower prices, or through lower disclosure).
Therefore, high volumes of disclosed information should be expected in a competitive marketplace when consumers' willingness to pay for services is low relative to the disclosure revenues available to rms.
14 It is also interesting to evaluate the ranking of both duopolists in generating consumer surplus, which is also depicted in Figure 6 . The high-disclosure duopolist generates higher consumer surplus in the market when it engages in high levels of disclosure (Region A and a neighboring subset of Region B). Recall that this duopolist sets a higher disclosure level than that of the monopolist in this range, d h > d m . The low-disclosure duopolist becomes the largest contributor to consumer surplus when it chooses not to engage in disclosure (most of Region B). The result underscores the fact that informed rational consumers can benet both from services intensive in disclosure as well as from services that are not, and neither commands superior welfare properties in the marketplace.
Empirical implications
In this section we identify qualitative predictions that can be drawn from our results and tested with market data in future empirical research. We start by summarizing the properties of duopoly equilibria in our model. The following table identies equilibrium predictions as a function of consumer valuations for the service.
14 To evaluate the robustness of this result we have also analyzed the case where rms are horizontally dierentiated, solving a Hotelling variant of our model where consumer utility is given by u i,j = v y i,j (1−y i,j −d j )−t d i,j −p j (the analysis is available from the authors on request). In this model, consumers are homogeneous in their valuation v but dier in their distance d i,j to rms, exhibiting an idiosyncratic preference for one of them. The intensity of competition is captured by transport cost parameter t. In a covered market equilibrium, it can be shown that rms set the monopoly disclosure level characterized in Proposition 1, so higher intensity of competition (lower transport cost t) does not improve consumer privacy. This conrms that our result is not an artifact of our focus on vertical dierentiation, and suggests that consumer preferences play an important role in shaping the interplay of competition and privacy. by exploiting disclosure revenues in both markets. We expect average willingness to pay E v and consumer heterogeneity σ v to be higher in the market for oce software than in that for retail search intermediation, among other factors because it is heavily participated by businesses in addition to consumers. Our analysis would then suggest that both Microsoft and Amazon are deploying successful business models to compete with Google in these markets.
Based on our preceding analysis and the equilibrium properties listed in the table, we next outline three main empirical predictions generated by our model. Empirical prediction 2. (Protability) When the average willingness to pay is low (high) relative to potential disclosure revenues in a competitive marketplace, the high-disclosure (low-disclosure) rm realizes higher prots.
Proposition 4 shows that the relative performance of rms competing with privacy depends on the valuation mean of the consumer population. When consumers' willingness to pay is low relative to the revenues rms can generate by disclosing their information, rms exploiting disclosure revenues derive higher prots. The contrary is true when the willingness to pay of consumers is relatively high. This prediction implies that Microsoft and Amazon should be more protable than Google in the markets identied in our examples. We also note that market shares and prot rankings are positively correlated in our model, so we should expect Microsoft and Amazon to also derive larger market shares.
Empirical prediction 3. (Information) In a competitive marketplace, the low-disclosure rm only obtains a larger stock of consumer information than the high-disclosure rm when setting a no-disclosure policy.
Proposition 5 shows that the information stocks accumulated by both duopolists coincide when they both engage in a positive level of disclosure. When the low-disclosure rm chooses not to engage in disclosure, however, it obtains a larger information stock than the competitor. Therefore, Amazon and Google should accumulate an equivalent information stock from consumers in the market for retail search intermediation, given that they both engage in disclosure. In the market for oce software applications, however, Microsoft should accumulate a larger information stock of documents than Google Docs because it provides a no-disclosure service while Google does not.
Concluding remarks
At the outset of this paper we set out to address some questions which can now be answered. First, how does privacy aect competition? Our analysis suggests that privacy can soften the intensity of competition when consumers (a) are heterogeneous so that rms can eectively dierentiate in their privacy policies, and (b) their willingness to pay is not exceedingly high so that rms disclosing their information can operate protably. Second, should rms exploit all available revenue sources, prices and disclosure, or focus on one? Firms under competitive pressure should focus on a single revenue source. Firms may exploit disclosure revenues and subsidize consumers in order to attract them to their service, or choose not to engage in disclosure and quote positive prices instead. Third, which strategy is more protable and what does it depend on? When consumers' willingness to pay is low relative to the revenues generated by disclosing their information, rms focused on disclosure revenues will outperform their competitors. And conversely, rms focused on price revenues will perform better when the relative willingness to pay of consumers is high. In both cases, rms maximize prots at the extensive rather than the intensive margin, outperforming competitors by attracting a larger customer base to their service.
In concluding our analysis, it is important to stress that we provide a benchmark for informed and rational consumers. We expect increasing consumer awareness of disclosure practices and familiarity with its implications to reinforce its relevance. Recent surveys of consumer attitudes towards privacy underscore this trend. Alan Westin, a pioneering scholar in the eld of privacy, noted in 2008 that oering online users free email or free searches did not seem to a majority of our respondents to be a sucient set of benets or valued services to overcome the instinctive feeling of not wanting to be tracked and marketed to based on their online transactions and surfs. 15 We also expect transparency to play an important role in informing consumer decisions and delivering a competitive supply of services. Initiatives to make disclosure practices salient and understandable for consumers are clearly desirable from a policy perspective. But our results recommend caution on restricting disclosure practices. We have shown that high-disclosure services play an important role in a competitive marketplace and informed consumers adjust their choices accordingly.
Finally, our framework also provides a context to understand innovation in the provision of information-intensive services. Social networking, for instance, can be understood as a service innovation that generates utility for users willing to post information that would otherwise remain private. In the mobile app ecosystem, new services are ourishing that help consumers store and process snippets of their personal information. Firms supplying these innovative services are accumulating consumer information, and such information stocks generate new disclosure opportunities. Consumer data brokers are aggregating information from increasingly diverse sources, enabling these services to monetize consumer information snippets by contributing to broader proling. And new instances of such services will continue to emerge with future advances in information technologies. These underlying technology drivers suggest that consumer privacy will continue to shape competition for the foreseeable future. 15 See Alan Westin's report`How online users feel about behavioral marketing and how adoption of privacy and security policies could aect their feelings,' Privacy Consulting Group, March 2008. the second-order condition ∂ 2 π l (d k l , d h )/∂d 2 l < 0, given the disclosure orderingd k l ≤ d h taking d h as exogenous. This identies a parameter space over V − , V + , and d h for each valid best-response of rm l, and allows us to discardd c l which is never a valid best-response. The same process can be repeated to identify the valid best-responses of rm h, where the disclosure ordering is given by d l ≤d k h taking d l as exogenous. This allows us to discardd a h . The valid best-responses of both rms are given bŷ
We next identify candidate equilibria by solving for d l and d h based on each combination of valid best-responses for rm l and rm h, and evaluate whether the solution is contained in the parameter space where both best-responses hold. It can be readily veried that the single candidate equilibrium in the game is given byd b l andd c h . Also note that ∂d b l /∂d h > 0 and ∂d c h /∂d l > 0, so rm disclosures are strategic complements. Firm disclosures in the candidate equilibrium are characterized by
within the parameter space
For the candidate equilibrium to hold, rm disclosures must be contained within the valid disclosure range, d j ∈ [0, 1]. Corner solutions need to be considered when valid best-responses fall outside the valid disclosure range. Inspection of d bc l and d bc h reveals that rm disclosures in the candidate equilibrium can adopt negative values. The parameter space for interior and corner solutions can be identied by determining the range where rm l's best-response binds d bc l ≤ 0 and evaluating whether the best-response of rm h given byd c h (d l = 0) also binds or not. This The interior and corner solutions identied above must yield a covered market in order to constitute an equilibrium. Inspection of the indierent consumer v f (p h , d h ) across the interior and corner solutions reveals that v f ≤ V − is always the case, so the market is eectively covered.
Appendix B
This appendix examines whether the solution characterized in Proposition 2 constitutes an equilibrium of the game in which rms may choose not to cover the market. We proceed by evaluating unilateral deviations to uncovered market congurations by each rm, and show that such deviations only pay o for rm h in a small region of the solution space. This region is depicted in the right panel of Figure 2 .
A unilateral deviation by rm j to an uncovered market conguration consists of a disclosureprice pair d u j and p u j which satises v f > V − (ensures that low-valuation consumers prefer not to purchase) taking the other rm's strategy as xed and given by d −j and p −j characterized in Proposition 2. Recall that consumers with higher valuation v i ≥ v f always prefer to participate in the market given that ∂u i,j /∂v i > 0, so an uncovered market conguration implies that low valuation consumers choose not to participate. We consider unilateral deviations by rms in the rst and second stages of the game that satisfy d l ≤ d h and p l ≥ p h , and evaluate their impact on consumer demand and information provision y u j in the third and fourth stages.
We need only consider deviations by rm h. Note that deviations by rm l cannot yield an uncovered market given that rm h's equilibrium strategy in Proposition 2 ensures that v f ≤ V − , so no unilateral deviation by rm l can yield an uncovered market. A unilateral deviation by rm h that yields an uncovered market can result in three dierent market congurations. If V − < v f < v p < V + after the deviation, both rms continue to derive positive demand. If V − < v f < V + ≤ v p , rm h takes over the market and serves all participating consumers. If v f ≥ v p , rm h derives no demand after the deviation. We can dismiss the last case because such a deviation will never payo for rm h.
Consider rst the case of deviations where both rms derive positive demand. The deviation prots of rm h, to be denoted by π u h , can then be written as
where the pivot consumer v p is given by (8) , the indierent consumer v f by (3), and consumer information provision for the deviating rm y u h by (2), accounting for rm h's deviation disclosure d u h and price p u h . In order to identify the most protable deviation we next solve for the optimal deviation price of rm h,
We next argue that it is optimal for rm h to take over the market and serve all participating consumers when deviating to an uncovered market conguration. Plugging d l and p l from Proposition 2 and optimal deviation price p u h in (10) into the pivot consumer v p in (8) as well as the indierent consumer v f in (3), it can be shown that v p (p l , p u h , 1] across the solution space characterized in Proposition 2. This implies that it is always optimal for rm h to take over the market when deviating, because the optimal price in an uncovered market conguration where v f > V − ensures that v p > V + so that all participating consumers purchase from rm h.
The deviation prots of rm h in an uncovered takeover conguration (where it takes over the market) are given by
The optimal deviation price of rm h is then the highest price that ensures that all participating consumers sign up to its service. The pivot consumer must then be given by v p = V + . 
Closed-form solutions for optimal deviation disclosure d u h cannot be derived, unfortunately.
We proceed by determining the disclosure range for d u h to yield an uncovered market given optimal deviation price p u,t h . Denote the upper boundary of this disclosure range by d u h . Solving for v f (p u,t h , d u h ) = V − obtains two candidate solutions. It can be shown by plugging d l and p l from Proposition 2 (for the interior and corner cases) into both candidate solutions that only the following one is well dened within the feasible disclosure range d h ∈ [0, 1],
We have established that a unilateral deviation by rm h to an uncovered market conguration can only be protable in the disclosure range d u h < d u h and entails rm h setting price p u,t h to take over the market. Outside this disclosure range, the optimal pricing strategy of rm h implies covering the market, and therefore cannot yield higher prots than those derived in the solution characterized in Proposition 2. Given that a closed-form solution is not available, we use numerical analysis to identify protable deviations. We identify parameter pairs (V − , V + ) within the solution space of Proposition 2 where deviations by rm h to price p u,t h in (11) and disclosure in the range d u h ∈ [d l , d u h ) where d u h is given by (12) yield a higher prot than that derived in the covered market equilibrium, π u,t h > π h . The region where uncovered market deviations pay o for rm h is depicted in the right panel of Figure 2 , and the code used to perform the numerical analysis is available from the authors on request.
